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THE BLACK SURROGATE MOTHER 
Anita L. Allen* 
In earlier essays, I considered two aspects of the practice of surrogate 
parenting. 1 In the first article, I examined the Baby M case and argued 
in favor of an inalienable constitutional right of the surrogate mother to 
a post-natal opportunity to change her mind about relinquishing parental 
rights.2 The second essay, considered-and rejected-the "slavery equa­
tion argument" against surrogate motherhood.3 This third article con­
templates another facet of surrogacy-gestational surrogacy.4 I will 
comment on johnson v. Calvert, 5 a case involving a Black surrogate 
mother, and on whether gestational surrogacy by Black women simply 
puts a new face on an old problem: whites owning Black women's 
wombs.6 
The American slave experience, while not equivalent to surrogacy, 
can help illuminate why many people find the practice of commercial 
surrogacy disturbing. Before the American Civil War, virtually all south-
*Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. B.A., New College, 1974; M.A., University of Michigan, 
1976; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1979; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. 
1. "Surrogate parenting" can be described as a practice by which a woman ("surrogate 
mother") bears a child for another woman, man or couple. As the major legal cases 
of the past decade have noted, before conception and for a fee, a surrogate mother 
agrees to be artificially inseminated and later to terminate parental rights and 
surrender custody of the resulting child. 
2. See Anita Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759 (1988) 
[hereinafter Privacy, Surrogacy] (rejecting privacy case for specific enforcement of 
surrogacy agreements and defending plausibility of inalienable constitutional right 
to post-natal opportunity to change mind about relinquishing parental rights). 
3. See Anita Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 
139 (Winter 1990) [hereinafter Surrogacy, Slavery] (rejecting argument that slavery 
and surrogacy are morally equivalent on the ground that the equation ignores the 
virtually total control of the slave owner over the slave that is absent from surrogacy 
arrangements). 
4. Gestational surrogacy is a process whereby a preembryo is created from the egg of 
a woman and the gametes of a man (spouse or donor) thorough in vitro fertilization. 
The preembryo is implanted into the uterus of a second woman who becomes 
pregnant and carries the child to term. As will be discussed later, this practice has 
currently been used only in cases where the woman who supplied the egg was 
medically unable to become pregnant. There are, however, no rules that require a 
preexisting medical condition before making use of a gestational surrogate. 
5. Reporter's Transcript, Johnson v. Calvert (No. X 63 31 90 consolidated with AD 
57638) (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Transcript]. No opinion has been 
published in the case. 
6. Alice Walker, What Can the White Man . . . Say to the Black Woman, 248(20) THE 
NATION 691 (1989) (noted Black noveUst depicting current reproductive policy as 
continuation of white male ownership and control of Black women). 
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em Black mothers were, in a sense, surrogate mothers. Slav
e women 
knowingly gave birth to children with the understandin
g that those 
children would be owned by others. 7 Occasionally, however, a Black 
woman was able to get back her child. In Surrogacy, Slavery, and the 
Ownership of Life,8 I related the true story of Polly, a Black woman who 
was kidnapped from her home in illinois and sold into slavery in Mis­
souri.9 Polly brought and prevailed in two remarkable lawsuits, one for 
her own freedom and a second to obtain custody of her teenage daugh­
ter, Lucy. Polly's successful custody battle against her child's white 
owners is reminiscent of Mary Beth Whitehead Gould's battle against 
the Stems in the Baby M case. 10 
Johnson v. Calvert11 has sparked a new wave of concern that surrogate 
motherhood turns women into "commercial slaves 24 hours a day for 
270 days. "12 The Johnson case highlights a troubling truth underlying 
the rhetoric that contemporary surrogacy is slavery. Affluent white 
women's infertility, sterility, preferences and power threaten to tum 
poor Black women, already understood to be a servant class, 13 into a 
"surrogate class." 
There are risks inherent in surrogacy arrangements. These risks 
centrally include the emotional devastation experienced by surrogates 
who are compelled to give up the children that they have agreed to bear 
for others. Parental rights deemed inalienable prior to childbirth could 
perhaps reduce the emotional risk of commercial surrogacy to white 
genetic and gestational surrogates.14 But in light of widespread preju­
dice, racism and racial segregation, such a right would be of doubtful 
7. In some aspects, American slavery was analogous to a de facto system of surrogacy. 
Slave owners were recognized not only as the owners of the slaves but they were �so owners of the nat:ural children to which the slaves gave birth. These ownership 
n�hts allowed the children to be bought or sold to third parties, regardless of the 
w1shes of the natural mother. See infra note 9.  Cf. Walker, supra note 6. 
8 .  13 HARv. J .L.  & PuB. PoL'v 139 (Winter 1990}. 
9. Lucy Delaney, Struggle� for Freedom, in Srx WOMEN's SLAVE NARRATTVES 9 (1988) 
(woman held wrongly m slavery later sues for her own release and "the right to 
own her own child"}. 
10. �n re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, mld 
m part, remanded, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). See generally PHYLLIS CHESLER, 
SAcREo BoND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M. (1988}. 
11.  Transcript, supra note 5. 
12. Jeremy Rifkin & Andrew Kimbrell, Put A Stop To Surrogate Parenting Now USA 
Today, .Aug. 20, 1990, § A, at 8 (final ed.}. 
' 
13. tcc?r�mg
. to figures published by the U. S .  Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor tatistics, m 1989, a typical, recent year: 
Bla�k females were und�rrepresented in the high-paid, largely female occu­
pations of sales, profe�s10nals, managerial and administrative support. They 
were overrepresented m the low-paid less prestigious occupations of service 
workers, operators, and household works. ?avid �wint?n, The Economic Status of African Americans: "Permanent" Poverty and nequaltty � .m THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1991 ( J .  Dewart ed 1991) In addition, 43 2% of all Black · · · · 
in 1989: Id. at. 43. it is predicted t�����W:� ����e�o�e.;e1�;;�nU:�rz ��= ���ncr;a.smg in
s
equality gap between [B]lack and white women." Jd. at 53. 14· n, nvacy, urrogacy, supra note 2. 
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practical value to Black gestators who bear white children. Under John­
son, the chances of the Black woman successfully gaining custody of the 
child she bears appear to be slim. Indeed, P olly had a better chance. 
Without a per se ban on commercial surrogacy, it is not clear that poor 
and Black women can be protected from the risks of surrogacy arrange­
rnents.15 
I. ANNA HAD A BABY 
On September 19, 1990, in Orange C ounty, California, a twenty­
ni ne-year-old Black woman named Anna L. Johnson gave birth to a six­
pound, ten-ounce baby boy. 16 A casual observer visiting the maternity 
ward at St. Joseph' s  Hospital would have found nothing unusual in the 
sight of Anna Johnson breastfeeding the tiny newborn. However, as 
the journalists who swarmed into the hospital to report the birth knew, 
Johnson and the infant she delivered had an unusual relationship. They 
were not genetically related. They were not even of the same race. For 
the first time in history, an African-American woman had given birth to 
a child exclusively of European and Philippine ancestry.17 
Anna Johnson's pregnancy was the result of in vitro fertilization and 
preembryo transplart-.18 P hysicians had surgically implanted into John­
son's uterus a preembryo formed in vitro from donated gametes. Al­
ready the single mother of a preschool-aged daughter named Erica, 
Johnson underwent the procedure as a service to Mark and Crispina 
Calvert.19 Mark Calvert was a thirty-four-year-old insurance adjuster2° 
and Crispina Calvert, who had lost her u terus to cancer, was a thirty­
six-year-old registered nurse. 21 Crispina C alvert worked at the hospital 
where Anna Johnson worked as a licensed vocational nurse. 22 The 
Calverts promised to pay Johnson $10,000 for her trouble.23 
15. At least 11 states have banned surrogate parenting. See Rifkin & Kimbrell, supra 
note 12. 
16. Custody Battle Begins Over Surrogate's Baby, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1990, § A, at 1, 
col. 3 (Orange Cty ed., Metro Desk) [hereinafter Custody Battle]. . 
17. This is the ftrst case in which a surrogate mother without genetic links to the child 
sought custody of the child. See Martin Kasindorf, Birth Mother is True Parent, Doctor 
Testifies, Newsday, Oct. 10, 1990, at 15 (News) [herein�fter Birth !'vfolher]. �nna 
Johnson, described in the media as Black or as an Afncan-Amencan, descnbed 
herself at the evidentiary hearing in the case as "half�white .. 
". See Martin Kasindorf, 
Overwhelming Maternal Instincts; Surrogate Mom Explams De�zsron, Newsday, Oct. 11, 
1990, at 15 (News) [hereinafter Overwhelming Maternal lnstmcts]. M�rk Calvert, the 
father, was described as Caucasian. Crispina Calvert, the genetic mother, was 
described in news reports both as a "Filipina" and as of "mixed Asian ancestry." 
See Charles Bremner, Surrogate Mother Loses Claim to Baby, The Times, Oct. 23, 1990, 
at 11, col. 4 (Overseas). . . . 
18. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, 46(3) Ethzcal Co�szderatzo�s 
of the New Reproductive Technologies 585 (supp. 1, 1986) [hereinafter Ethzcal Consid-
erations). . 
19. �me women who are not parties to surrogacy cor:'tracts un�ergo these exp�nslve, 
time-consuming procedures hoping to deliver a child they will parent as tJ:telf own. 
A woman whose ovaries have been surgically removed or whose fallop1� tubes 
are obstructed, for example, may undergo these procedures. See generally zd. 20. See Kasindorf, Overwhelming Maternal Instincts, supra note 17. 
21. ld. See also Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17. 
22. ld. 
23. /d. 
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Anna Johnson was a new kind of "surrogate mother, " a surrogate 
gestational mother. But the human intere�t in Anna Johnson's miracle 
was not just that she was a surrogate gestational mother;24 Ann� Johnson 
was, in addition, a surrogate gestator who had changed her rrund about 
giving up a child to whom she was not genetically related. Commercial 
surrogate mothers had been known to change their minds before,25 but 
this was the first publicized instance in which a "surrogate carrier, ges­
tator, womb mother, or placental mother"26 had done so. 
Johnson filed a lawsuit on August 13, 1990, when she was seven 
and a half months pregnant. Alleging that the Calverts had neglected 
her during the pregnancy and failed to make payments, and that she 
had developed a bond with the unborn child, Johnson sued for parental 
rights and child custody. 27 
The Calverts answered that the baby was theirs alone: "He looks like 
an oriental baby with my husband's nose," Crispina Calvert said.28 
Although Johnson was willing to accept a court-ordered joint-custody 
arrangement, the Calverts were not. They announced to the news media 
that they would rather see the baby they would name "Christopher" in 
a foster home than to share parenting with their hand-picked gestator.29 
Johnson's lawyer, Richard C. Gilbert, countered that he could not com­
prehend the CaJverts' belief that it would be "in the baby's best interest 
to be taken from the breasts of its birth mother. "30 
In September 1990, Orange County Superior Court Judge Richard 
N. Parslow, Jr. awarded temporary custody to the Calverts and granted 
Johnson visitation rights.31 In an October hearing, the court heard legal 
argument and expert testimony on ·the question of permanent custody. 
Some expert testimony favored the Calverts . However, medical and 
psychological experts testified on behalf of Anna Johnson's claim to be 
the
_
"tru�" mother.32 Johnson also had other authority on her side. A 
Califorrua statute expressly provided that birth mothers are the natural 
and legal parents of their offspring.33 In addition, a 1989 Supreme Court 
24. The first reported childbirth by a surrogate gestational mother occurred in April 
1986 in Oeveland, �
-
hio. The genetic mother, like Crispina Calvert, had had a 
hysterectomy. Phys1aans at the Mt. Sinai Clinic created a preembryo in vitro, using 
an egg harvested from the genetic mot'her's ovaries and her husband's sperm. The 
preembryo was implanted into the uterus of a second woman. The second woman, 
like �na Johnson, became pregnant and carried the child to term. See Ethiet1l 
Considerations, supra note 18, at 58S. 
25. �n re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rerld 
m part, remanded, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
26. See Ethical Considerations, supra note 18 at  SBS. 
27. See Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17. 
28. Custody Battle, supra note 16. 
29. Id. 
30. ld. 
31. Se� Who'� Mommy? Without a Law lts Hard to Know, Newsday, Sept. 24, 1990, at 48 (VIe�pomts) (N
_
assau and Suffolk ed.). See also Genetic Parents Given Sole Custody of Child, L.A. T1mes, Oct. 23, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 2 (Metro) [hereinafter Genetic Parents]. 
32. Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17. 
33. CALIF. CIVIL CooE § 7003 (1983) reads in part: 
§ 7003. Method of establishment 
The parent and child relationship may be established as follows: 
� .............................. ..... 
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case had denied parental rights to a sperm donor claiming only a genetic 
link to a child.34 
A nna Johnson testified at the October hearing that she did not ini­
tially plan to keep the child.35 Johnson said that she first changed her 
mind when Mark Calvert refused to take her to the hospital . She was 
forced to take a cab for what proved to be false labor pains. While 
Johnson was a patient, Crispina Calvert, who worked in the same hos­
pital, refused to visit. Even after she began to want the child, Johnson 
said that she was "in a state of denial" and she kept "trying to tell myself 
that I am not supposed to have any emotion toward my child, but there 
is no way that you can prevent those emotions from taking over, and 
those instincts came out naturally."36 Describing her state of mind at 
the time as confused, anxious and desperate, Johnson admitted sending 
the Calverts a letter on July 23, 1990, threatening to withhold the baby 
unless they paid her $5,000 immediately. She also acknowledged that 
the Cal verts had sent her two periodic payments early. 37 
After her testimony, Johnson told reporters she was confident of 
obtaining at least joint custody and visitation rights: "I know he's there 
. . . I know he won't forget me."38 However, on October 22, 1990, Judge 
Parslow ruled that Anna Johnson had no parental rights whatsoever in 
the child she bore.� By way of consolation, the judge offered that 
C rispina Calvert might elect to provide Anna Johnson with "a picture 
now and then, a note as to how this child is doing in life."40 
II. ANNA'S "MISTAKES AN D WEAKN ESSES" 
A. She Could Not Win 
Public reaction to the final decision in the Johnson case was rnixed.41 
It is unclear that the outcome of Anna Johnson's case was a bad outcome 
on the merits. There was too little information in the court transcript 
(1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be established by proof 
of her giving birth to the child, or under this part . .. .  
See also CALIF. CrVIL CooE § 7001 (1983): 
§ 7001. Parent and child relationship; defined 
As used in this part, "parent and child relationship" means the legal 
relationship between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to 
which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. 
It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relation­
ship. 
34. Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
35. Kasindorf, Overwhelming Maternal Instincts, supra note 17. 
36. ld. 
37. ld. But see Chesler, supra note 10, at 5-7. In the transcript of a tape recorded 
conversation between Mary Beth Whitehead Gould and William Stem, Gould 
threatened to kill herself and Baby M. Nonetheless, she was eventually awarded 
parental rights. 
38. Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17. 
39. See Genetic Parents, supra note 31. Judge Parslow terminated the temporary custody 
and visitation order he had imposed in September. Id. 
40. See Transcript, supra note 5, at 20. . . .  
41. Sonni Efron & Kevin Johnson, Decision Hailed as Proper, Cnticized as Outrageous, �.A. 
Times, Oct. 23, 1990, §A, at 1, col. 5 (Orange Cty ed., Metro Desk): See also Votces, 
L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, §A, at 12, col. 1 (Orange Cty ed., Fore1gn). 
-
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and in newspaper accounts to meaningf�y assess the r�lative strengths 
of the parties and various alternate child custody options. However, 
one can argue that presiding Judge Parslow's attempt to rationalize his 
decision fell short. 
Judge Parslow delivered a thirty-five-minute oral statement from the 
bench42 to a packed courtroom. 43 He did not �nnoun�e his decision right 
away, nor did he need to. Judge Parslow s operung remar� made 
obvious his ultimate ruling. He declared that the case before him was 
"not an adoption relinquishment case, .. . not a baby selling case, . .. 
not a Baby M type case where we had natural parents on tw� sides of a 
situation competing. "44 To say that the johnson case was unlike Baby M 
was already to conclude that a surrogate gestator who received a donated 
preembryo is not a "natural" mother on par with a surrogate gestator 
who supplies her own ovum. Yet any gestator's relationship to the child 
she delivers is undeniably biological; in that sense it is also "natural." 
As soon as Johnson's suit became public, legal policy analysts dis­
cussed johnson v. Calvert as the next chapter in the history of a repro­
ductive revolution of which Baby M was but a dramatic early scene.45 
Many observers viewed the cases as closely analogous. In both cases 
women became pregnant for a cash payment of $10,000 and a desire to 
help a childless married couple have a child of their own. In both cases 
the surrogate said she had developed a bond during pregnancy that 
made it difficult to part with the newborn as agreed. In both cases the 
contract to exchange reproductive services for cash raised concerns about 
gender inequality and "baby selling." In both cases the presumption 
that a woman who gives birth to a child is its legal mother seemed to 
implicate adoption policies. Yet, contrary to these views, Judge Parslow 
tried to rapidly distinguish the case before him from Baby M. Judge 
Par�low's sense of the case was that neither adoption laws, proscriptions 
agamst commercial trafficking in human beings, gender inequality, nor 
the developing law of genetic surrogate motherhood was relevant to his 
decision. 46 
. 
Judge Parslow asserted in his opening statement that awarding the 
child to two mothers--three parents--was not in the boy's emotional 
best. interest. 47 Therefore, he would award only one of the two female 
pa�ties c�stody over the child. Once the judge refused to view the case 
as
,
mvolvmg a surrogate mo�,her or adoption agreement, his rejection of 
a three parent/tw? �other model could have meant only one thing: �e would select Cnspma Calvert, not Anna Johnson as the child's sole, 
nghtful mother. Theoreti�ally, Judge Parslow might have rejected both 
Johnson and the Calverts m favor of a neutral third-party caregiver, such 
as a foster mother. But Judge Parslow ruled out third-party alternatives . 
42. No formal opinion was issued in johnson v. Calvert at the time of the ruling against �nna Johnson. The cour: report�r's ?fficiaJ transcript memorialized the judge's, at 
4
3 
5
time
G
s, a�kward explanation of hts difficult decision. See Transcript, supra note 5. . ee enetrc Parents, supra note 31. · 
44. Transcript, supra note 5, at 3. 45-5 CaFt. · 5 · · ee . r,ornra urrogacy Case Rmses New Questions About Parenthood Christian Science Morutor, Sept. 25, 1990 at 1 col 1 (U S )  ' 46. Transcript, supra note S, at 3� 
. . . . 
47. ld. 
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He understood his role as Solomonic: unable to divide the baby in half, 
the judge would choose between the genetic and gestational mothers. 48 
The race issue, Anna Johnson's race, also made Judge Parslow's 
ultimate decision predictable.49 Throughout history, Black women and 
mulatto women have been hired or enslaved to play a number of im­
portant de facto "mothering" roles in American families.50 Moreover, 
Black women who marry white men have sometimes wound up "moth­
ering" white step-children. However, I suspect that few regard Black 
women as the appropriate legal mothers of children who are not at least 
part Black. Blacks are not supposed to have white children. Blacks are 
not s upposed to want to have white children of their own-not in the 
adoption context51 and not, therefore, in the surrogacy context. 
For better or for worse, race is a factor in adoption, and it will also 
be a factor in surrogate gestation. Against this background, it was 
unimaginable that Anna Johnson would win custody of the child she 
bore from the Calverts' genetic material. Arguably, a lawsuit against 
the Calverts brought by a white or Asian surrogate gestator would have 
the same outcome. A judge deciding such a case would foresee the 
possibility that a Black or brown or yellow gestator might someday wind 
up with a white couple's genetic child unless it set a firm precedent 
favoring genetic parents. 
B. Rationalizing Her Loss 
Judge Parslow very briefly recited the facts of the case as followsY 
The parties met and discussed a gestation arrangement in the winter of 
1989-90. They entered into a formal agreement on January 15, 1990. 
Against the scientific odds, a successful preembryo transplant took place 
just four days later on January 19, 1990. Johnson agreed orally and in 
writing to "relinquish the child to the Calvert's and make no claim for 
parental rights. "53 
The court had little to say about Anna Johnson's pregnancy. Judge 
Parslow spoke of Johnson's role in the passive voice: "a baby boy was 
delivered from Anna Johnson on September 19, 1990."54 Test results 
48. /d. 
49. The Calverts' attorney raised the issue of race in what one reporter described as 
an "emotional" courtroom, asking Johnson whether she had ever told anyone s�e 
had always wanted a white baby . Johnson said no, "considering I'm half-whtte 
myself." See Kasindorf Overwhelming Maternal Instincts, supra note 17. 
50. Set Walker, supra note 6. . . 51. Official bans on transracial adoptions have been held uncons�tutional. See� e.g., 
�ompos v. McKeithen, 341 F.Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (three�Jud9e court) (mval­
tdating Louisiana statute prohibiting interracial adop�on as a vt�lation of the Equal 
Protection Clause). However, while whites are sometimes pe�r utted to adopt Black 
or bi-racial children, it is virtually unheard of for an adoption agency .to offer a 
healthy, able-bodied white child to Black parents for adoption. Cf. Patnoa Ballard, 
Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma, 17 J. FAM. LAW 333 (1978-7?); .
su.san 
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color, 17 BuFFALO L. REv. 303 (1�68); Shan 0 Bnen, 
Race in
. Adoption Proceedings, 21 TULSA L.J. 
485 (1986). Cf. Richard Posner, The 
Regulatzon of tile Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59 (1987). 
52. Transcript, supra note 5 at 3-4. 53. /d. • 
54. /d. at 4. 
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"showed that Anna has no genetic relationship to the child, and that 
there is a 99.999% probability that the Calverts are the genetic parents 
of the child. "55 On the basis of the genetic tests, the judge found "beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Crispina Calvert is the genetic, biological and 
natural mother ... and that Mark Calvert is the genetic, biological and 
natural father of the child. "56 If future courts follow Judge Parslow, 
genes alone will establish natural and biological motherhood. 
Judge Parslow resorted to two analogies which are indicative of how 
courts may come to characterize the unique role of the surrogate gestator. 
He analogized Johnson to a "foster parent providing care, protection 
and nurture during the period of time that the natural mother, Crispina 
Calvert, was unable to care for the child. "57 Judge Parslow admitted 
that "there is [sic] a lot of differences" between a gestator and fo ster 
parent, but concluded that "there is [sic] a lot of similarities."58 
His second analogy compared surrogate gestators to "wet-nurses."59 
As recently as the last century it was common for affluent European and 
American families to pay women to breast-feed and tend their infants 
and small children. Judge Parslow thought it was plain enough that 
wet-nurses lack parental rights: "I'm not sure anyone would argue that 
the person that nursed the child . . .  from seven pounds to thirty pounds 
got parental rights and became the mother. "1:!0 In the judge's view, 
surrogate gestators are just as plainly without parental rights. One 
might have expected the court to resist an analogy to the medically and 
socially discredited practice of wet-nursing. If surrogate gesta tion is like 
wet-nursing, perhaps it, too, should be relegated to history. 
To counter the impression that he endorsed the use of surrogacy by 
women who are neither infertile nor sterile, Judge Parslow underscored 
the Calverts' medical need. "This is not a vanity situation, somebody 
looking to avoid stretch marks," he said. 6t For medical reasons, Crispina 
Calvert "has no place to carry the child. "62 The question of vanity versus 
�edical need may be a different, deeper matter for the courts to consider 
m the future. It is for "medical" reasons that couples often cannot 
reproduce on their own. But, it was not for medical reasons alone that 
Crispina Calvert possessed a preembryo in need of a gestator. It wa s 
als
_
o for psychological and social reasons. Crispina Calvert wanted a 
c
_
hild and she valued genetic parentage over other options such as adop­
tion. It was not for medical reasons alone that researchers learned to 
create preembryos in petri dishes and test tubes. It was also for the 
sake of satisfying the
_ 
public preference for genetic parentage. 63 What 
cou�ts must con�ont IS whether satisfaction of the strong desire to have 
one s own genetically-related children is worth the social price of sur­
rogacy arrangements. 
These rationales raise serious questions. Why does a person who is 
55. /d. 
56. /d. at 4-5. 
57. /d. at 5.  
58. /d. at 6. 
59. ld. at 17. 
60. ld. 
61. /d. at 6. 
62. /d. 
63. See California Surrogacy C R · N ase atses ew Questions About Parenthood, supra note 45. 
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like a foster mother or a wet-nurse have no parental rights? Why does 
a surrogate gestator have no parental rights against those who seek out 
her services for "medical" reasons? To answer these questions Judge 
Parslow focussed on what gestators and genetic parents provide their 
offspring. The genes we get from our genetic parents determine "who 
we are, what we become."64 By comparison to what we get through 
our genes, we get little in the uterine environment, not even a clear-cut 
reciprocal bond with our gestators.65 The limited comparative impact of 
the gestator on the child's future self, and Judge Parslow's doubt of the 
reality of a mother-child bond during pregnancy, were the core of a 
larger set of arguments he offered against parental rights for gestators. 
Writing about the B,aby M case, I stressed the importance of the 
genetic ties that Mary Beth Whitehead Gould had to her child .66 I argued 
that the parity of the surrogate's genetic ties with the biological father's 
was one reason to accord her equal parental rights. 67 But to say that 
genetic heritage is a factor to consider in surrogate mother cases involv­
ing disputes between genetic parents, is not to say that in a battle 
between genetic and gestational parents, genetic parents should always 
win out. Like the knowledge of genetic linkage, the experiences of 
pregnancy and childbirth can also have an important role in shaping 
women's sense of their identities and responsibilities. 
Introducing additional concerns, Judge Parslow argued that both the 
emotional well-being of the child and policies against custody disputes 
or extortion militate against awarding parental rights to a "gestational 
carrier." Interestingly, the judge did not mention the race issue in his 
decision on the case. The closest he came was to allude to the potential 
"identity problems" a child raised by two mothers might have. Racial 
identity is one kind of identity individuals in our society normally de­
velop, along with their gender, ethnic, religious, regional and other 
forms of identity. Also weighing against the gestator, in Judge Parslow's 
view, is the desirability of a judicial policy favoring "surrogacy contracts 
in the in vitro fertilization cases. "68 There is, he said, "a tremendous 
demand longing [sic] out there for genetic children of people that are 
not able to have children."69 Surrogacy contracts are neither "void nor 
against public policy," ruled Judge Parslow, and are "enforceable by .. . 
specific performance, [or] arguably even by habeas corpus, if neces­
sary."70 This is precisely contrary to the ruling of New Jersey Supreme 
Court Chief Judge Wilenz in the Baby M case, who held that surrogacy 
contracts are void, against public policy and not specifically enforcea­
ble.71 
C. Finding Fault 
The main thrust of Judge Parslow's argument for enforcement of the 
surrogacy contract was that opportunistic, dishonest Anna Johnson had 
64. Transcript, supra note 5, at 8. 
65. ld. 
66. See Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1790. 
67. ld. at 1764. 
68. Transcript, supra note 5, at 11. 
69. ld. 
70. ld. 
71. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
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signed the contract voluntarily. The judge doubted the sincerity of 
Johnson's statements that she believed the child was hers and that she 
had bonded with the child. He intimated that Anna Johnson's lawsuit 
was opportunistic since such statements were fir_st made shortly before 
the lawsuit was filed.72 Yet, Johnson cannot fauly be blamed for the 
timing of her action. It would have been in the later stages of pregnancy 
that she would have been likely to experience the keenest maternal 
feelings. Bringing a lawsuit promptly at that point to clarify her legal 
rights and duties was a responsible course. 
Judge Parslow also intimated that Anna Johnson was dishonest. He 
said she omitted unspecified facts about the difficulty of her first preg­
nancy and misrepresented her feelings and intentions in this case.73 As 
for the contract itself, Judge Parslow conduded that Anna Johnson knew 
what she was doing. Johnson was "29 years old, educated, a licensed 
professional, .. . [who had spent two or three years] in the marine 
corp[s]."74 She "sounded ... articulate and intelligent.""'S Judge Parslow 
said he couldn't "remember having seen a cooler witness testifying in 
court."76 His words hinted that Anna Johnson was perhaps too cool for 
the occasion. Although. "[s]ometimes there is a problem there where a 
flat affect ... is presented by a witness," he said, "I don't think she 
had any problems with the lawyers at all."77 
The large constitutional questions of family and reproductive privacy 
that occupied the trial and state supreme court in Baby M barely surfaced 
in the Johnson case. Judge Parslow seemingly danced over the whole 
tapestry of constitutional concerns in a sentence.7s He was sure that the 
"
_
gen�tic " mother, and not the "carrying person," has whatever procrea­
tive nghts the Supreme Court has established as fundamenta1.79 It is far 
from clear that he was right about this. After aJI, in this context, the 
surrogate undergoes the greatest physical burdens of procreation�m­
bryo transplant and pregnancy. Moreover, the thrust of the fundamental 
privacy rights established in Roe v. Wade would seem to be that a range 
of contractual _limitatio1_1s on pr�gnancy termination and prenatal conduct 
would be vmd, notwithstandmg the procreative interests of infertile 
couples.80 The �xt�nsive literature in the field makes plain that these 
matters of constituti
_
onally protected rights are much more complicated 
than even the questions suggested in light of Roe v. Wade.s' 
72. Transc�pt, supra note 5, at 11. See also Genetic Parents, supra note 31. 
73. Transcnpt, supra note 5, at 12-13. 
74. /d. at 13. 
75. /d. 
76. Id. 
77. ld. 
78. Trans.cri�t, supra note 5, at 15 ("I think, probably, as I see it, there are some ��;:��
r
�·��al problems with trying to outlaw them [i.e., surrogacy agreements) all 
79. ld. at 15-16. 
80. Court enforcement of a b ti · ti . 
ny a or on or other prenatal conduct constraints which 
f;�ri:�f�� 1�c���ra��� sum?g.acy contr�ct� appear to be in tension with �e 
choice in the ab 
' prohi.bJts state dmunution of the right to procreabve 
(1973). 
sence of a compelling state interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
81. See, e.g., Richard Posner The Eth · d E ' ICS an conomics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogatt 
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The judge was more attentive when stating recommendations for 
state law. Judge Parslow's central recommendation was that the Cali­
fornia legislature enact a surrogate gestator statute. His ruling effectively 
brushed off as irrelevant California Civil Code Section 7003.82 He none­
theless called for legislation clarifying the statute "given the technology 
that we can have a different natural mother than the person from whom 
the child emerges. "83 
Given his remarks about Johnson's competence and voluntary action, 
the tenor of the judge's specific recommendations for legislative policy 
are puzzling. Although he emphasized that Johnson acted intentionally 
and intelligently, he recommended strenuous surrogate screening pro­
cedures by disinterested agencies to determine "how they [potential 
surrogates] feel about various aspects in these situations. "84 
Judge Parslow mentioned that enforcing surrogacy agreements was 
a way to avoid patronizing women,85 yet several of his recommendations 
appear to contradict this intent. As institutionalized support for back­
sliders, he recommended a twenty-four-hour "hotline" to reinforce 
surrogates' resolve to give up the children they carry.86 This recommen­
dation seemed to imply that surrogates will not, on the whole, be fully 
committed to their undertaking and that second thoughts about surro­
gacy are a predictable "crisis" requiring intervention measures. Further, 
he recommended a requirement that only women unable to bear children 
for "medical" reasons be permitted to employ surrogates. No vanity 
uses of surrogacy would be allowed. Finally, Judge Parslow recom­
mended a legal requirement that surrogates be experienced natural 
mothers: "I think they know what its like, they know what their feelings 
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH LAw & PoLICY 1 (1989); Walter J. Wadlington, 
Baby M: Catalyst for Refomr?, 5 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH LAw & PoucY 1 (1989); Allen, 
Privacy, Surrogacy, supra note 2; Katharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE 
L.J.  293 (1988); James Flaherty, Enforcement of Surrogate Mother Contracts: Case l.Jrw, 
the Uniform Acts and State and Federal Legislation, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 223 (1988); 
Thomas W. M ayo, Medical Decision Making During a Surrogate Pregnancy, 25 Hous. 
L. REv. 599 (1988); Steven Miller, Surrogate Parenthood and Adoption Statutes: Can a 
Square Peg Fit in a Round Hole?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1988); E. De M a rco, The Conflict 
Between Reaso11 and Will in the Legislation of Surrogate Motherhood, 1987 AM. J. JuRIS. 
23 (1987); Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 
99 HARv. L. REv. 1936, 1950 (1986); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: The Outer Limits of 
Protected Conduct, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1131, 1141 (1986); Lizabeth Bitner, Womb for Rent: 
A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulating Surrogate Parenting Agree­
ments, 90 DrcK. L. REv. 227, 236-37 (1985); Barbara Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose 
Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 256 (1985); Note, Developing a Concept of the 
Modern "Family": A Proposed UnifomJ Surrogate Parenthood :4ct, 7� GEo. L.J. 1283, 
1284 n.5 (1985); George Smith and Roberto lraola, Sexualrty, PriVacy_ and_ the New 
Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263, 285 (1984); John A. Robertson, Procreahve Lrberty and 
the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 420 _(1983); Phyllis Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestwns for 
Solutions, SO TENN. L. REv. 71, 82 (1982). See generally MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE 
MOTHERHOOD (1988). 
82. See CALIF. CIVIL CoDE § 7003, supra note 33. The statute defines birth mothers as 
natural, legal parents. 
83. Transcript, supra note 5, at 18. 
84. ld. at 16-17. 
85. ld. at 15. 
86. !d. at 19. 
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are and it would assist them in their decision making process."87 The 
val�e of this recommendation is questionable given that the two most 
famous surrogate mothers in the United States to date, Anna Jo�nson 
and Mary Beth Whitehead Gould, already had one or more children 
when they reneged on their surrogacy agreements. 
The baby boy Anna Johnson carried in her womb �nd delivered was 
awarded categorically to the Calverts. The court derued the request of 
Johnson's attorney for a continuation of visita�on rights,Pe.nding aJr 
peal.BB His reason was simple. At the age of ftve weeks thmgs [such 
as bonding] are happening psychologically."� To Anna Johnson th� 
court awarded a philosophy of self-blame attributed to the Greek p�­
losopher Democritus: "Everywhere man blames natur_
e and f�te, yet his 
fate is mostly but the echo of his character and pass1ons, hts mlStakes 
and weaknesses. "90 Her fate too. 
III. BEYOND ANNA'S STORY 
A. Rejecting Intent Rule 
What norms should govern modern procreative arrangements and 
parental status? In a recent article Professor Marjorie Shultz defended 
a principle of intent as the optimal norm.91 She urged that the inevitable 
disputes that arise in the context of collaborative procreation made in· 
creasingly possible through new reproductive technologies should be 
resolved, in the first instance, by reference to the intentions of the 
parties. The standard of intent presumably respects the autonomous 
plans and expectations created through voluntary exchanges. It assumes 
women's competence. It avoids judicial paternalism by giving effect to 
women's efforts to make choices concerning the use of their reproductive 
capacities. It assures men secure, responsible roles in procreation. The 
norm of intent entails legal respect for individual autonomy, including 
female autonomy, and legal minimalization of the impact of knowing or 
purposeful harm. 92 Yet the norm of intent is problematic. It is incon· 
sistently applied and it is based on an assumption of greater equality of 
opportunity than actually exists. 
On the surface, the standard of intent appears morally well-founded. 
Its "morality" j ustifies the pain it causes those who change their minds 
and renege on prio� agre�ments. Courts that enforce surrogacy agree· 
ments of the sort. at Issue m Baby M and Johnson inflict pain on the losing surrogate. A losmg surrogate not only suffers grievous emotional loss, 
but she must also confront a fate she once chose in ignorance of its true 
character but no longer chooses. From the point of view embraced when 
the standard of intent is accepted, the evils that the losing surrogate 
87. ld. 
88. See Custody Battle, supra note 16. 
89.  Transcript, supra note 5, at 24. 
90. /d. 
91. Marjorie Shultz, R
_
eproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity �r Gender Neutralrty, 1990 Wis. L .  REv. 2 9 7, 302 (1990) [hereinafter Reprodudiut 1 echnology and Intent-Based Parenthood]. 
92. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 9 1. 
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suffers are not evils a t  all;  they are voluntary choice . Or, if they are 
evils, they are justly imposed. 
One problem with the standard of intent is that it is ,md would be 
inconsistently applied. Already it is not applied across the board in 
cases involving non-traditional parenting arrangements, such as homo-
exual relationships.93 Moreover, if courts can justify enforcing surro­
gacy contracts by appeal to intent, they can, by the same token, justify 
enforcing betrothals, marital vows and other per onal undertakings. 
Yet, the latter contracts are no longer enforced. I believe su rrogacy 
arrangements should be treated in the same manner as other personal 
agreements, that is, as unenforceable commitments, rather than as en­
forceable commercial contracts.94 In those instances where custody bat­
tles arise out of failed surrogacy agreements, courts should be ready to 
intervene in the "best interest of the child," just a they currently inter­
vene when custody battles arise out of failed marriages or love a ffairs. 
In practice, the "best interest of the child" interventions might still 
turn out to favor genetic parents more often than gestators. But the 
explicit reason would not be the backward-looking reason that parties 
once intended that result.  It would be the forward-looking reason that 
the court is persuaded of the genetic parents' superior abilities to provide 
a home for the child. Conceivably, genetic parents would always win 
under a "best interest of the child" analysis when they were white and 
more affluent than the child's minority gestator. 
Another problem with the standard of intent is that it presupposes 
a backdrop of greater equality of opportunity than presently exists. 
Ceteris paribus, a woman with practical nursing skills has more oppor­
tunity and a wider foundation for self-determination than a woman 
without skills and no high school diploma. Yet, opportunity is a matter 
of degree. The United States has a recent history of legally enforced 
race and gender inequality. Economic and social pressures over which 
individuals have little control significantly d ictate their "voluntary" 
choices. A 1989 study showed that 43.2% of all Black women with 
children under the age of eighteen in the United States lived below th.e 
poverty leveJ.95 Habitually low social expectations concerning appropn­
ate vocations for white women and certain minority groups limit the 
horizons of individuals in these groups faced with "free" choices. More­
over, some forms of liberty and contractual voluntarism impinge upon 
other, equally important values. If liberty must be tempered by fairness, 
equality and dignity, it is doubtful that the standard of intent can do .
all 
of the normative work that must be done in the wide field of procreative 
arrangements and parental status. 
9J. In a recent case mvolving a Jesb1an couple who had intentionally uhlized artificial 
inscminallon to become the parents of two ch1ldren, the court refused to �ndo.
rse 
either woman's proposed ch1ld-custody plan, and demed parental. and 
viSitation 
nght . The court deemed the mtenbon of the lc b1an parent!> 1rrelevant. See 
Lt$bum Is Demed Custody After Breakup, N Y  Time , Mar. 24, 1991, at 22, col. 1 .  
94 .  Stt Allen, Surrogacy, S/JJvery, supra note 3, at 147. ("Surrogacy arrangements ?re 
be t v1ewed as unenforcable personal comm1tments or vow bctwei!n unmamed 
ind1v1dual ."). Cf. Allen, Pnvacy, Surrogacy and the Baby M Ca'-", supra note 2 
(accord). 
95. Stt U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stattc;bc , upra note 13 and accom-
panying text. 
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B. New Face, Old Problem 
What can the white man say to the Black woman? For four 
hundred years he ruled over the Black woman's womb . . . . It 
was he who placed our children on the auction block. . . . We 
see him . . .  make the Black mother, who must sell her body to 
feed her children, go down on her knees to him.96 
Minority women increasingly will be sought to serve as "mother 
machines" for embryos of middle and upper-class clients. It's a 
new, virulent form of racial and class discrimination. Within a 
decade, thousands of poor and minority women will likely be 
used as a "breeder class" for those who can afford $30,000 to 
$40,000 to avoid the inconvenience and danger of pregnancy.97 
It has been said many times before, but it bears repeating: tolerating 
practices that convert women's wombs and children into valuable .market 
commodities threatens to deny them respect as equals. Commercial 
surrogacy encourages society to think of economically and socially vul­
nerable women as at its disposal for a price. Segments of the public will 
draw the obvious parallels to slavery and prostitution.98 Their reaction 
may seem melodramatic. But it is a telling reminder of soda! attitudes 
and history. Genetic heritage, while a factor, should not be dispositive 
in a battle between genetic and gestational parents. The experience of 
pregancy and childbirth, like the knowledge of genetic linkage, can play 
an important role in shaping women's sense of themselves and their 
responsibilities. 
I believe that policymakers should discourage surrogacy, chiefly by 
(1) refusing to legally enforce commercial surrogacy agreements; 
(2) ascribing to surrogates parental rights that they may voluntarily 
relinquish only after the birth of a child they are paid to carry;99 and by 
(3) m�g no distinction between genetic and gestational surrogates 
when 1t co�es to the assignment of parental rights. Legislation shaped 
around pomts (1) and (3) would increase the risks of entering into 
surrogacy arrangements for the economically more powerful parties (the 
consumers and brokers of surrogacy) and decrease the risk of surrogacy 
arrangements for the less economically powerful (the surrogates). 
Black gestators would remain vulnerable to emotional devastation 
�ven if surrogacy policies were in line with points (1), (2) and (3), and 
if race were not a factor for the court in awarding child custody under 
the
_ 
"best int�rest" standard. A Black gestator who wanted to keep her 
wh1�e of�sprmg, as Anna Johnson did, would likely be pressured by 
farruly, friends, and experts to do otherwise. She would know that racism 
96. Walker, supra, note 6. 
97. Rifkin & Kimbrell, supra note 12. 
98. Ruth
"
�aum, Le_tter to the Editor, The San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 6, 1990, § A, at 20. ( I ve got JUSt one question concerning the Anna Johnson surrogate mother case: If a woman can legaJJy rent her uterus for nine months why should the law prevent h�r from renting her vagina for an hour or two? . ' . .  [Prostitution and surro
l 
gacy mvolve] · · · commercial use of one's body for someone else's convenience or p easure. ") 
99. See Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, supra note 2. 
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could add special stresses on individual members of her multiracial 
family, leading to acrimony and rejection. too 
Limitations on the alienability of parental rights, point (2) above, can 
greatly benefit some surrogate mothers. Inalienable post-delivery pa­
rental rights as limitations on surrogacy would clearly benefit white 
surrogates who, like Mary Beth Whitehead Gould, want to keep their 
genetically-related children. The benefit of point (2) to gestational sur­
rogates, especially Black gestational surrogates, is less clear. First, ge­
netic ties have special meaning in American culture. In deciding child 
custody under the "best interest of the child" standard, I predict courts 
would be reluctant to award children to gestational, as opposed to 
similarly situated genetic, parents. Second, since genetic parents will 
probably be better educated and more affluent than gestational surro­
gates, courts are likely to view them as better equipped to provide good 
homes. Third, most consumers of surrogacy are whites who want white 
children. Although Black women's infertility and sterility rate is higher 
than white women's, 101 few Black women utilize surrogate mothers.102 
It follows that most Blacks who are surrogates will be surrogate gestators 
for whites. The children born to Black gestational surrogates will be of 
another race. Racial difference between mother and child may incline 
courts against awarding custody to the Black surrogate gestator. 
The number of Black gestators who could master their rational fears 
and overcome judicial resistance to go with their hearts would likely be 
small compared to the number who, with tragic emotional consequences, 
would feel compelled to give up their offspring. We can only imagine 
what Anna Johnson's life would have been like had she prevailed in her 
custody bid. Perhaps her own bi-racial heritage steeled her for the 
battles she would have faced as head of a multiracial family. Her will­
ingness to fight to parent her gestational child was virtually as remark­
able as the biotechnology that made it possible. Like Polly, the slave 
who sued for her own freedom and then for the right to own her own 
child, Anna Johnson was exceptionally courageous. 
CONCLUSION 
According to my analysis, few Black surrogates who desire to keep 
their gestational children could easily decide to do so. Surrogacy laws, 
even surrogacy laws that equally favor genetic and gestational surrogates 
over genetic parents, offer Black gestational surrogates little protection. 
As an ironic consequence, Black gestators could be the safest surrogate 
mothers for white women who want white children. 103 In light of these 
inequities, the Johnson case may force the conclusion on behalf of Black 
women that a per se ban on commercial surrogacy is the safest-the 
wisest--course. 
100. For example, a Black gestator could foresee that her multiracial family could attract 
curiosity and prejudice. . 
101. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women m 
REPRODUCTlVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's 23 (N. Taub & S. Cohen eds. 1989). 
102. ld. 
103. Cf. California Surrogacy Case Raises New Questions About Parenth�, s�pra note .45 
(potential for racial discrimination since "couple may be more mchned to htre 
minority woman to carry the child, either for financial or other reasons"). 
